behind the others, and especially if it was disadvantaged in the past, preferential treatment if fully justified. But if this nation/group is ahead of the others, providing preferences to this entity at the expense of the other groups would be seen as unfair. Nationalism is the ideology of expanding the rights of the particular ethnic group or country -if this expansion is intended to overcome the lagging behind and to catch up with the others, more privileged groups or countries, it is perceived as fair. If it is aimed at gaining superiority, it is seen as unfair.
To cite a couple of examples, most Western nations provide economic assistance to all developing countries and give preferential access to their markets (low or no tariffs) to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), whereas many developing countries retain higher trade barriers than developed countriesmost economist justify such a policy on the grounds that it helps poor countries to catch up with rich countries. By the same token, special assistance to less developed regions and ethnic groups is a basic principle of most countries and international associations, EU included.
Of course, there are many real and imaginary reasons, why a nation may feel disadvantaged -it may be a victim of aggression or colonialism, may be unhappy with its position in international arena, etc. Here, however, I look only at real (not perceived) economic reasons of nationalism. To be more precise, this paper tries to explain the rise of nationalism in many Western countries and Russia in recent three decades by the interaction of two variables -the dynamics of relative per capita income and the change in income distribution. The hypothesis is that trends in nationalism are explained by both between the countries and within the countries inequalities. If the gains from globalization are distributed evenly, the public is willing to embrace it, but if the gains are appropriated by few, it is easy for nationalist political forces to turn the public against globalization.
Hence, there are several types of globalization models, depending on the trend in inter and intra-country inequalities in recent three decades:  Great gains from globalization for the country as a whole and relatively small rise in within the country inequalities (Japan, China, SEA, continental Western Europe);  Small gains from globalization for the country as a whole, but decline in domestic inequalities (some LA countries, including Brazil);  Large gains from globalization for the country as a whole, but increase in domestic inequalities (Britain);  Small gains from globalization for the country as a whole and increase in domestic inequalities (US, Russia in the 1990s).
The worst conditions for the rise of nationalism would be in the first group of countries, the best -in the last, fourth group, with the 2 nd and 3 rd group falling in between.
It is certainly true that the rise in nationalism may be caused by a variety of reasons that are not associated with the change in per capita income and inequalities. A nation may feel humiliated after a lost war or after unfair treatment by other countries and international community, or there may be a propaganda machine at work to create a feeling of superiority over other nationalities -all these reasons are not analyzed in the paper. The goal of this paper is quite modest -to show that a considerable portion of the dynamics of nationalist feeling in recent decades is explained by the change in between and within countries inequalities.
Nationalism and inequalities within countries
Conservative politicians all over the world have recently spoken against globalization. It would be wrong, however, to blame globalization for all the disasters and misfortunes, from nongrowing real incomes to the rise of nationalism. History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Those who blame globalization today for economic and social misfortunes are similar to the luddites of the XIX century that believed that the use of machines leads to the rising unemployment and falling wages.
There are cases when globalization works leading to rising incomes of the masses. Theoretically greater international flows of goods, ideas and technology, capital and labor should increase productivity, but in reality this happens only if these flows are carefully managed.
Why in some countries greater economic interaction with the world was accompanied in recent several decades by rising income and its relatively even distribution (China and other East Asian countries i ), whereas in other countries modest growth of income coupled with rising inequalities left large masses of the population worse off (many Western countries, including the US, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union)? The answer is that policy matters a great deal and many good policies that allow gaining from globalization are often non-orthodox and counterintuitive (Polterovich, Popov, 2005) . If globalization is accompanied by the increase in income and wealth inequalities within countries, so that gains from globalization are appropriated by the few better off, whereas the masses get nothing or very little, it is only too easy for the interested political forces to blame globalization for the negative developments.
The central argument of this paper is that the reversal of the previous trend towards the decline in income inequalities in the last three decades in most countries created favorable grounds for the rise of nationalist and anti-globalization feelings.
Putting the recent dynamics of income and wealth inequalities into the longer term perspective, it is easy to notice that recent 30 years were quite unique. The secular trends suggest increasing inequality from the ancient times before reaching an all-time peak in the early twentieth century ( Latin American country -Argentina; Asian countries -Japan, India, China, Singapore, Indonesia; SubSahara Africa -South Africa, Mauritius, Tanzania. Overall -about ½ of the population of the world.
Comparison of the wealth of the richest tycoons in different countries in different epochs (Figure 3) points to a similar conclusion -compared to the average income in the US, Bill Gates was relatively richer than Carnegie and Crassus (though not richer than Rockefeller), whereas Russian tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003 was even richer (compared to the average income in Russia) and Carlos Slim was relatively richer than all of them! The world may not have reached the highest level of inequality yet, but may still be moving to the greatest inequality ever observed in human history. One explanation of these trends is that the reversal of growing inequality followed the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the emergence of the USSR and other socialist countries, the strengthening of socialist and populist movements, the growth of the welfare state and other changes associated with Karl
Polanyi's Great Transformation (Jomo, Popov, 2016) . The strength of robust and egalitarian alternatives have constrained and checked economic inequalities, especially as long as socialism was relatively dynamic and seemed to be catching up with the West (Popov, 2014a, Ch. 3; Popov, 2014b) .
When socialism lost its dynamism from the 1970s and posed less of a threat, the conservative reaction in divided by the number of answers "not very proud" and "not proud at all". The decline in the pride index is taken as a proxy for nationalism variable: if less and less people are proud of the country, they are likely to support nationalist leaders promising "to make the country great again". The rise of the index is symptom of healthy development -the country is on the right track, globalization is perceived to be good and fair by more and more people. The dynamics of this index for all countries on which data are available is shown at figure 4. Developing countries generally have a higher pride index -probably because these are more traditional and less globalized societies. But it is the dynamics of the pride index that could be used as an indicator of nationalism -when pride in one's own country declines, it is easier to mobilize support for nationalistic measures.
The increase in pride index appears to be associated with the economic success of the country -the greater was the increase in per capita income in the period in question , the larger was the increase in the pride index ( fig. 5 ). Another factor that influenced the change in pride index was how evenly (fairly) the economic success of a country was distributed -increase in income inequalities had a negative impact on the increase in pride ( fig. 6 ).
The Figs. 5-6 allow to see several patterns of change in the pride index. In China pride index increased due to strong growth of per capita income and despite the noticeable increase in inequalities. In Chile, Mexico, Turkey and Russia the growth of per capita income was more modest, but income inequalities did not widen, but even decreased a bit. In Poland economic growth was moderate, but income inequalities widened and the pride index declined, whereas in the US the decline in the pride index was caused by both -weak per capita income growth and widening inequalities.
Case studies -US, EU, Russia

US
In the United States in the late eigtheenth century, income and wealth inequalities were initially probably lower than in Europe due to the absence of large accumulated fortunes in the New World and the availability of abundant 'free land'. In the late eighteenth century, the top 10 percent of wealth holders accounted for only 45 percent of total wealth in the US, compared to 64 percent in Scotland and 46-80 percent in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (Soltow, 1989) . But it appears that inequalities increased greatly in the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, reaching a peak between the two world wars. Soltow (1989) finds some decrease in income inequality in 1798-1850/60 period in the US, and little or no increase in wealth inequality over the same period. However, the ratio of the largest fortunes to the median wealth of households ( 
Figure 7. Inequality in the US and UK over the long run, Gini coefficients (%)
Sources: The Gini coefficients were computed by Milanovic from social tables before the twentieth century and from household survey and tax returns afterwards (Milanovic, 2011; Milanovic et al., 2007) , and personal correspondence with Milanovic. N.B. Comparable data for the 1867-1929 period are not available.
Also, the very recent trend towards increasing inequality seems to be unique in another respect -it has paralleled an increasing rate of profit. During the post-war Golden Age, typically, when profits were high, capital's success was shared with other social groups. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, wages, salaries and social security benefits grew together with rising profit margins. But since the early 1980s, profit margins have increased hand in hand with rising inequalities (fig. 8) . Economic misfortunes contributed to the increased mortality and morbidity, especially for the poor nonHispanic whites, whose relative position and status declined the most. Case and Deaton (2015) document a marked increase in the mortality of middle-aged white non-Hispanics in the US after 1998 in all 5-year age groups from 30 to 55. The leading causes for the increased mortality were poisoning, suicide, chronic liver disease, and cirrhosis. Increasing mortality in middle-aged whites was matched by increasing morbidity. When seen side by side with the mortality increase, declines in self-reported health and mental health, increased reports of pain, and greater difficulties with daily living show increasing distress among whites in midlife after the late 1990s.
They see some economic reasons for such a mortality rise. "Although the epidemic of pain, suicide, and drug overdoses preceded the financial crisis, ties to economic insecurity are possible. After the productivity slowdown in the early 1970s, and with widening income inequality, many of the babyboom generation are the first to find, in midlife, that they will not be better off than were their parents.
Growth in real median earnings has been slow for this group, especially those with only a high school education. However, the productivity slowdown is common to many rich countries, some of which have seen even slower growth in median earnings than the United States, yet none have had the same mortality experience…. The United States has moved primarily to defined-contribution pension plans with associated stock market risk, whereas, in Europe, defined-benefit pensions are still the norm.
Future financial insecurity may weigh more heavily on US workers, if they perceive stock market risk harder to manage than earnings risk, or if they have contributed inadequately to defined-contribution plans" (Case and Deaton, 2015) .
This dominant ethnic group of non-Hispanic whites (about 200 million people out of over 300 million), especially men, is exactly the group that gave rise to nationalism in the US. As public opinion polls show, the greatest support for Trump in the US comes from white middle aged men without the college degree and relatively poor (http://politicsthatwork.com/blog/trump-supporters.php).
EU
In most European countries income inequalities increased since the beginning of the 1980s -the reversal of the trend that predominated since early 20 th century ( fig. 9 ). This increase in inequalities may be the single most important reason for the rise of nationalism. In Eastern Europe there was a transformational recession of the 1990s associated with the transition to the market economy -output fell by 20-50% in the course of 2-5 years (Popov, 2000) , which certainly contributed to the rise of nationalism. But in Western Europe there was no major recession (except for Greece), economic growth was not very strong, but rather stable, recessions of 1993 (per capita GDP fell by 0.4%), 2009 (-4,7%) and 2012-13 (-0.4%) were overcome and average incomes, unlike in the US, by 2016 were way higher than in the 1980s. However, the progressing unevenness in income distribution undermined real incomes and social status of large groups of European population making them an easy target for the nationalist politicians. From the point of view of economic efficiency and future growth, Brexit is bad for the EU and especially bad for Britain. 70% of the Dahrendorf working group members and expert believe that Brexit will weaken the UK, but EU will muddle through (Oliver, 2016) . But the majority of British voters apparently blamed economic difficulties not on policies that allowed inequalities to increase, but on the European integration and globalization. It is also noteworthy that there was no major surge in nationalist feelings in Russia during and after the 2008-09 recession, when the economy was barely growing or not growing at all. The explanation is probably associated with some stabilization of social sphere -income inequalities stopped growing and even declined somewhat ( fig. 12) , crime rates and murder rates declined markedly. 
Russia
Conclusions
The rise of nationalism in recent decades seems to be associated with the increase in income inequalities. In some countries income inequalities did not increase and nationalist and anti-globalist feelings are more related to the slowdown of growth and other reasons, but in most countries there was an increase in income and wealth inequalities since the 1980s -a reversal of the trend of over 50 years that created a fertile ground for rise of nationalism.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, collapse of the USSR and the conversion of Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics to capitalism, added additional push to the growing income inequalities trend due to both -the disappearance of "socialist counterbalance" for the Western capitalism and the rise in inequalities in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union themselves.
It may be hypothesised that the continuation of these trends could result in two outcomes. First, there may be social upheavals in some countries, where social tensions due to growing inequalities will become unbearable and produce a social turmoil. And the rise of nationalism may lead to conflicts, if not wars, between countries, with collapse of the international trade and capital flows, like in the 1930s.
Then the world goes once again over the familiar 20 th century historical track and there may be a pause in or even the reversal of globalization, like during the Great Depression, when the outburst of protectionism led to the decline of the international trade and capital movements. This is the worst scenario: the world degrading into social and national conflicts.
Second, countries that carry out successful policies of limiting inequalities would become more competitive, driving other countries "out of business". Even small countries, if they are successful, may create a counterbalance through the demonstration effect to the tendency of unconstrained capitalism to cut welfare programs and increase inequalities. By limiting inequalities these societies will be drifting in the direction of socialism. They may regulate the functioning of the market mechanisms through direct interventions and high progressive taxation to reduce bubbles and windfall profits. Besides, the crucial way of lowering inequalities is public and collective property, so it could be expected that state enterprises, non-profit institutions, labour managed enterprises and coops, operating not for profits, but for public good would become more common. There may be a rise of the new grass root socialism growing from below that would become more competitive than capitalist societies (Popov, 2014c) . Such a more optimistic scenario implies that social upheavals within countries and national conflicts between countries could be largely avoided.
These are only the hypotheses of course, based on the projection of current trends into the future.
